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The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk with Each Other . . . and
Sometimes Agree

Abstract:
Portland, Oregon is often cited as an example of successful regional governance and
effective regional planning. The metropolitan area appears to match many of the precepts of
the popular "compact city" model of urban growth and to demonstrate the capacity of local
and state government to shape growing metropolitan regions. Given this reputation, it is
important to evaluate the relevance of the Portland experience for other communities, sorting
unique local circumstances from generalizable characteristics.
This analysis explores the spatial character of metropolitan Portland in the 1990s,
summarizes the politics of regional planning, and examines weaknesses in the Portland
approach. The conclusions offer suggestions for other metropolitan areas. The study finds
that many of Portland's accomplishments center on urban design, but that the region's most
distinguishing characteristic is its attention to political process. The analysis concludes with
suggestions about the value of extensive civic discourse, incremental policy making, and
institution-building.
Keywords: Growth management; Metropolitan government; Regional planning
Introduction: Portland as a Planning Model
Portlanders are proud of themselves. Like the residents of many other U.S. cities,
residents of Portland, Oregon can be formidable boosters of their home community. Ask
around town and you'll learn that Portland is special for its climate ("mild," not rainy), its
views of snow-capped Mount Hood, its small town ambiance and "just folks" style, and its
success at fending off many of the problems of urban sprawl and congestion. In this selfsatisfied picture of achievement by avoidance, Los Angeles has long been damned, Seattle
has sold its soul, and only Portland still treads the strait way of good planning.
Outsiders might freely dismiss these latter claims as the standard wares of hot-air
merchants were they not shared by many well-informed observers around the nation.
Portland enjoys a strong reputation in the circles of urban planning and policy as a well
planned and livable metropolitan community. The city and region gained initial attention in
the late 1970s and 1980s and have enjoyed a surge of positive commentary in the 1990s.
Inspection junkets have become a steady contributor to the Portland tourist economy as
journalists try to discover "how Portland does it" (Langdon 1992; see Goldberg 1994 for an
example) and civic delegations make the rounds of Portland's leaders and in search of lessons
for their own city.
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The admiration starts at the center. According to its press clippings, Portland is one
of the few large cities in the United States "where it works" (Economist 1990). Over the past
twenty years, it has frequently appeared near the top of urban livability rankings. An
informal poll of planning and design experts in 1988 rated Portland's efforts to deal with
urban design issues among the best in the United States (Laatz 1988) and the city makes
regular appearances on lists of the nation's best managed cities (McEnery 1994).
Beyond the city limits, the Portland area is a prime exhibit for innovative institutions
for the management of metropolitan growth and services. In a burst of institutional creativity
in the 1970s, the Oregon legislature crafted a statewide system for mandated land use
planning (Abbott and Howe 1993; Leonard 1983; Knaap and Nelson 1992) and the voters of
the three core metropolitan counties created an elected regional government (Nelson 1996;
Abbott and Abbott 1991). The Department of Housing and Urban Development recently
credited region-wide cooperation for supporting a successful transition from traditional
manufacturing to a knowledge-based economy (Tripp 1996).
Given this level of attention, it is worth taking a serious look at the what exactly other
communities might learn from Portland. This paper therefore addresses three questions that
other cities might ask in considering Portland's reputation and record.
o First, what are the specific initiatives and accomplishments that set Portland apart from
comparable cities in the United States?
o Second, what factors have allowed Portlanders to shape a city that meets the professional
criteria of good planning? What are the key steps and measures through which
Portlanders have shaped the metropolitan area during the last generation? What is the
balance of luck and pluck--of unique circumstances and local leadership--in shaping
the contemporary metropolis?
o Third, what lessons might other cities learn from the Portland experience? What is there in
the Portland story that other communities might want to imitate, and what problems
or complications might they wish to avoid? In practical terms, what aspects of the
Portland experience realistically hold the potential for imitation?
Analysis of these issues leads to two broad conclusions about the politics of good
planning. WHAT Portland has accomplished centers on decisions about urban design and
the physical shape of the central city and its related communities. HOW Portlanders have
shaped their cityscape and metroscape has to do most essentially with politics--with public
values, leadership, the capacity of planning agencies and local governments, and the quality
of civic discourse.
To summarize the "what" question, Portland is one of a limited number of United
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States metropolitan areas that measure favorably against the model of good urban form that
increasingly dominates the contemporary literature of urban planning and design. As
summarized in recent publications (Downs 1994; Rusk 1993; Beyond Sprawl 1995; Congress
for the New Urbanism 1996), this model embraces several normative prescriptions about the
characteristics of a balanced metropolis. First, it assigns high value to the maintenance of
strong downtowns in order to nurture cultural vibrancy, promote social cohesion, and support
nationally competitive advanced service industries. Closely related is the neotraditional turn
in neighborhood planning, which also stresses small scale planning and mixed land uses
(Calthorpe 1993; Kunstler 1993; Langdon 1994; Katz 1994). The third goal is tightly knit
metropolitan regions. Since the famous report on The Costs of Sprawl (Real Estate Research
Corporation, 1974), opponents of urban sprawl have had practical justifications for their
argument that the centered metropolis should also be compact. The concentration of
urbanized land within radial corridors and nodes presumably preserves green spaces and
farm lands, reduces energy consumption, and keeps infrastructure affordable (Frank 1989).
In exploring the second or "how" question, an analysis of the ways in which
metropolitan Portland has pursued the goals of centeredness and compactness confirms the
truism that planning is a political process. Good design and planning do not happen simply
because they are good ideas. They happen because a community talks itself into putting
ideas into action, and because that same community creates an infrastructure of
governmental systems and civic institutions to support and implement those decisions. In
short, it makes a difference where and how a community talks about its future.

Portland as a Compact Metropolis
Unlike many fast growing metropolitan areas in the American West--such as
Phoenix, Houston or Las Vegas--Portland is still best understood from the inside out (see
table 1 for Portland population trends). The metropolitan area is most interesting and
strongest at its center, whether the standard is regional economic leadership, cultural
creativity, or political clout.
Downtown
Metropolitan Portland is anchored by a strong and viable central core. The
downtown is walkable and attractive. Visitors to the city nearly always start at the center.
Time (Henry 1988) and the Atlantic Monthly (Langdon 1992), Architecture (Canty 1986)
and Landscape Architecture (1991) have all reported on the strength of downtown design, the
careful conservation of a sense of place, and the enhancement of the downtown with public
art. The New Yorker pointed to "closely controlled new building, the carefully monitored
rehabilitation of worthy old buildings, [and] the vigorous creation of open space" as key
factors creating a city of "individuality and distinction" (Roueche 1985). Downtown design
earned a City Livability Award from the U.S. Conference of Mayors in 1988 and an Award
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for Urban Excellence from the Bruner Foundation in 1989 (Peirce and Guskind 1993).1
Beyond its attractions of place, central Portland has retained economic and
institutional dominance in the metropolitan area. The central office core has increased its job
total and upgraded average job quality over the last twenty years, with the number of jobs in
five core census tracts increasing from 89,000 in 1980 to 104,000 in 1994. Downtown and
adjacent districts claim nearly all of the major metropolitan institutions and gathering places:
art, history, and science museums, performing arts center, several major hospitals, public
university, medical school, stadium, convention center, a new privately funded arena for the
Trail Blazers of the NBA, Pioneer Courthouse Square for political rallies, and Waterfront
Park for community festivals. Downtown Portland also has an unuslaly high share of office
space within its region. As of 1989, it had 66 percent of Class A space in the metropolitan
area, second only to downtown Pittsburgh and far above the 40 percent for all large office
markets taken together (Hughes, Miller and Lang 1992).
Inner Ring
Portland lacks the "dead zone" of derelict industrial districts and abandoned
neighborhoods that surrounds the highrise core of many cities. Nearly forty years ago, Edgar
Hoover and Raymond Vernon (1959) identified the problem of "gray areas" in older cities,
the old transitional zones that seemed to be falling out of the real estate market. Since that
time, most inner ring districts throughout the United States have followed an up-or-out
pattern in which the only options are gentrification or abandonment.
Portland, however, has seen essentially no abandonment, scattered gentrification, and
many areas that have retained old functions and attracted gradual reinvestment. Downtown
Portland is bordered by viable residential neighborhoods at several economic scales, by
neighborhoods in the making on waterfront industrial and railyard sites, and by strong
industrial-wholesaling districts.
Several of the latter districts were incorporated in Central City Plan of 1988 rather
than excluded as irrelevant to a growing downtown. The Central City Plan identified which
areas in the downtown frame to appropriate for intensified development for information
industries and information workers (Lloyd District, Willamette west bank) and which to
stabilize for blue collar jobs. In effect, the plan recognized that a seaport and regional trade
center needs to push both paper and payloads. An innovative industrial sanctuary policy uses
a zoning overlay to protect inner manufacturing and warehousing districts from the
incompatible uses such as big box retailing. This industrial sanctuary policy is a powerful
tool for avoiding the mismatch between the location of jobs and housing that afflicts many
1

A not surprising reaction to all this good ink is a skeptical recharacterization of downtown Portland as
a Disneylike theme park rather than a "real" place (Robert Shibley in Peirce and Guskind 1993; Bruegmann
1992).
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metropolitan areas. In 1994 the Central Eastside Industrial District counted 22,000 jobs and
the Northwest Industrial District counted. Major employment centers within two miles of
downtown added roughly 100,000 jobs to those in the central business district.
Middle Ring
Beyond the inner ring of apartment neighborhoods and industry lie Portland's
streetcar suburbs, the residential districts that first developed between 1890 and 1940. In
most cases, a third generation of families filled these neighborhoods in the 1970s and 1980s.
Several bypassed neighborhoods have experienced the same process in the 1990s. These
recycled neighborhoods support an unusually prosperous set of neighborhood business
districts and exceptionally strong schools. The public school system that serves the city of
Portland enrolls 92 percent of school age children in its district, and suburban systems even
higher percentages.
The conservation of older neighborhoods is most striking in the "West Hills," a large
crescent of upscale houses draped across the steep hills to the west of downtown. Initially
opened to residential development by cable cars, the West Hills became Portland's elite
district with the advent of family automobiles in the 1910s and 1920s. For three generations,
the affluent highlanders of King's Heights, Arlington Heights, Willamette Heights, Portland
Heights, and Council Crest have enjoyed views of Mount Hood and ten-minute commutes to
downtown offices. Protected by elevation from the lower-income residents and mixed uses
of the downtown fringe, successful businessmen, ambitious professionals, and heirs of
monied families have been able to maintain social status and leafy living without needing to
flee to suburbia.
Outer Ring
Portland suburbs have plenty of people (65 percent of the Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Area, or PMSA, plenty of jobs (45 percent of the PMSA), large stretches of
standard postwar cityscapes. Workers leave standard model subdivisions and apartment
tracts to battle clogged suburban highways in order to reach jobs in commercial strips and
office parks. Power retail stores compete with precast concrete manufacturing boxes and
landscaped corporate headquarters for prime acreage. Mile by mile, much of Washington
and Clackamas counties looks like the suburbs of Seattle or Denver.
In contrast to many other metropolitan areas, however, Portland's outer ring lacks
metrowide public facilities and concentrated employment centers that rival the historic
downtown. There is no equivalent to Houston's Galleria-Post Oak district or the Tyson's
Corner complex in Washington's Virginia suburbs. Specialists on the multinodal city can
identify only one "edge city" (Joel Garreau, 1991) or "suburban activity center" (Robert
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Cervero, 1989), and those flimsy examples at best.2 Instead, the outer ring of the
metropolitan area remains closely tied to the core through a radial highway system and a
developing radial rail system.
Indeed, the key structural reason that the Portland area suburbs remain supplementary
employment and consumption arenas is the lack of a suburban beltway. In the 1950s,
highway engineers decided to bring the city's first limited access freeways into the center of
the city and connect them with a tight freeway loop that hugged the edges of the central
business district. As an engineering decision, the route took advantage of available or easily
acquired rights of way and avoided the steepest parts of the West Hills. The economic
consequence was to maintain downtown Portland and its nearby neighborhoods as the most
accessible parts of the metropolitan area after the demise of streetcars and interurban
railways (Dotterrer 1974). The eastern half of a suburban freeway bypass through the less
fashionable side of the metropolitan area did not open until the 1980s. Plans for a
southwestern quadrant recently stalled in political traffic and a northwestern quadrant that
would violate parks and open spaces and require multiple bridges across the Columbia River
is even less likely.

The Politics of Portland Area Planning
In Portland as in every other city, planning is politics. Good ideas about urban form
do not realize themselves; they take shape through political decisions in which the
community considers alternatives and makes choices. In Portland, those decisions have
involved the construction of several interlocking and remarkably stable alliances around a
issues of urban form. These alliances have supported the creation of textbook examples of
planning and growth management institutions. In turn, such institutions have provided both
focus and forum for perpetuating and extending the political coalitions (Lewis 1996).
The Context of Coalition Building
These coalitions are products of the last thirty years.
In the decade after World War II (1945-1955), Portland politics revolved around traditional
battles between old guard and reformers over police corruption, proposals for city manager
government, and the acceptability of public housing (with the old guard emerging the
winner). In the next decade, the drivewheel of politics was a longstanding tension between
business interests on the east and west sides of the Willamette River, expressed in bitter
electoral battles over the location of public facilities such as a Coliseum and domed stadium.

2

Garreau identifies the Beaverton-Tigard-Tualatin triangle and Cervero the I-5 corridor from Tigard to
Wilsonville. These are overlapping areas in the westside suburbs.
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One reason for introverted battles over issues left over from the 1930s and 1940s was
Portland's failure to catch the postwar economic boom. From 1945 to 1965, Portland was
stodgy in social tone, cautious in leadership, and stingy with public investments. The
neoprogressive political reform movements that spoke for new economic interests and
transformed cities such as Denver and Phoenix bypassed Portland. Within the Pacific
Northwest, Seattle consolidated its economic lead with strategic investments in the
University of Washington, in the Century 21 exposition, and in facilities to handle
containerized cargo, and in community infrastructure. Saving rather than risking public
funds, Portland grew much more slowly as a regional wholesale and service center (Abbott
1992).
The late 1960s, however, brought important changes. The rise of a locally based
electronic and instrumentation industry and the expansion of business and professional
services brought in highly educated outsiders. Even without the newcomers, a new
generation of voters with limited interest in old battles paved the way for a new generation of
political leaders with fundamentally new municipal and regional agendas (Abbott 1983).
Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of Portlanders aged 15-34 increased from 22 percent
to 30 percent. In partial response, the average age of Portland City Council members
dropped by fifteen years between 1969 and 1973. Voters made similar changes in other local
governing bodies and in the city's legislative delegation.
This generational turnover transformed many basic assumptions of civic debate. The
core values of the older leadership had been formed by the tumultuous years that stretched
from the mid-1920s to the mid-1940s. Their goal for the postwar city was social and
economic stability. The newer leaders, in contrast, came of age during the optimistic years
of Great Boom of 1945-1974; they were more willing to risk new ideas and new public
investments.
This local revolution in public leadership coincided with changes in the national
dialogue about city planning and politics. Portland's new politics were informed by the
urban renewal and freeway critics of the 1960s, who emphasized the value of small-scale and
vernacular urban environments and the excitement of large cities. City planners rediscovered
that downtowns were complex collages of subdistricts rather than unitary wholes. Both
quality-of-life liberals working in the growing information industries and members of
minority communities reemphasized the values of place and the sought to make
neighborhoods effective instruments of resistance to large-scale changes in the urban fabric.
Within this changing national discourse, Portland stood out not for the content of its vision
but for its effectiveness in transforming the common vision into a comprehensive set of
public policies and for constructing powerful political coalitions around several planning
goals.
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Downtown and Older Neighborhoods
The 1970s in Portland were marked by the construction of a powerful alliance
between downtown business interests and residents of older neighborhoods. The same sorts
of forces that were impacting other U.S. cities in the era of the "urban crisis" drove the
political marriage. Downtown parking was inadequate, the private bus system was bankrupt,
and a new superregional mall in the affluent western suburbs threatened the end of
downtown retailing. At the same time, older neighborhoods were threatened by institutional
expansion, schemes for large scale land clearance and redevelopment, concentrating poverty,
and racial inequities.
The chief architect and beneficiary of the political transition was Neil Goldschmidt,
elected to City Council in 1970 and mayor in 1972 at age thirty-two.3 By the start of his first
mayoral term, Goldschmidt and his staff had drawn on a ferment of political and planning
ideas and sketched out an integrated strategy involving the coordination of land use and
transportation policies. They were strongly influenced by the 1970 census, which showed
the effects of a declining proportion of middle class families on neighborhood diversity and
city tax base. During 1973, 1974, and 1975, Goldschmidt's team brought together a variety
of ideas that were waiting for precise definition and articulated them as parts of a single
political package that offered benefits for a wide range of citizens and groups.
This so-called "population strategy" emphasized public transportation, neighborhood
revitalization, and downtown planning. Improved public transit would improve air quality,
enhance the attractiveness of older neighborhoods, and bring workers and shoppers
downtown. In turn, a vital business center would protect property values in surrounding
districts and increase their attractiveness for residential reinvestment. Middle-class families
who remained or moved into inner neighborhoods would patronize downtown businesses,
and prosperity would support high levels of public services. Neighborhood planning would
focus on housing rehabilitation and on visible amenities to keep older residential areas
competitive with the suburbs.
Preservation of a user-friendly downtown was the strategy's cornerstone (Peirce and
Guskind 1993). Business worries about suburban competition and parking problems
coincided at the end of the 1960s with public disgust with a blighted riverfront. In 1970-72,
an unusual alliance between city and state officials opened the opportunity to rethink
downtown planning. Neil Goldschmidt and other city leaders worked with Governor Tom
McCall and with Glenn Jackson, an electric utility executive who chaired the state Highway
Commission, to remove a multi-lane expressway from the downtown waterfront. The action
fired imaginations about radical responses to other downtown problems. The younger
3

Goldschmidt served as mayor until 1979, when he became Secretary of Transportation in the Carter
administration. He served as governor of Oregon from 1987 to 1990.
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generation of technically sophisticated citizen activists worked with city officials, downtown
retailers, property owners, neighborhood groups, and civic organizations to treat previously
isolated issues (parking, bus service, housing, retailing) as part of a single comprehensive
package.
The resulting Downtown Plan of 1972 offered integrated solutions to a long list of
problems that Portlanders had approached piecemeal for two generations. It was technically
sound because its proposals were based on improvements in access and transportation. It
was politically viable because it prescribed tradeoffs among different interests as part of a
coherent strategy. Specifics ranged from a waterfront park and pedestrian-oriented design to
high density retail and office corridors crossing in the center of downtown. The ideas found
strong advocacy in the mayor's office and an institutional home in the form of a downtown
design review process (Abbott 1991b). Sixteen years later, a new Central City Plan updated
the design elements and called for the careful extension of a thriving business core into
downtown fringe areas (Krumholz and Keating 1994).
A second piece of the strategy was to recycle older neighborhoods built from the
1880s through the 1930s. The city used Housing and Community Development funds and
leveraged private capital with tax-free borrowing for an extensive housing rehabilitation
program. Inflation of suburban housing costs in the 1970s also helped to retain families in
older, affordable neighborhoods. Several neighborhoods between the downtown and the
base of the West Hills experienced gradual gentrification by new residents looking for
Portland's closest imitation of a sophisticated urban environment. The bungalow belt on the
east side of the Willamette attracted a new generation of Portlanders looking for traditional
city neighborhoods of 50 x 100 foot lots, trees, sidewalks, and stores within walking
distance.
A political bargain with neighborhood activists accompanied direct investment
policy. After a series of confrontations between neighborhoods and city hall in the late
1960s, the Goldschmidt administration decided to legitimize and partially coopt
neighborhood activists by incorporating independent neighborhood associations as secondary
participants in public decision making (Hallman, 1977; Cunningham and Kotler 1983; Clary
1986; Berry et al. 1993). The acceptance and financial support of voluntary neighborhood
groups has offered a partial alternative both to confrontational tactics from the grassroots and
to top-down management of citizen participation from city hall.
The third element of the strategy was to shift investment from highways to public
transit. A new Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (Tri-Met) had absorbed the bankrupt
bus system in 1969. One of the key features of the Downtown Plan was a transit mall that
drew on the experience of Minneapolis. Completed in 1978, the mall increased the speed of
bus service and facilitated transfers. The second major transit decision was the 1975
cancellation of the so-called Mount Hood Freeway, a five-mile connector that would have
devastated half a dozen lower middle class neighborhoods in southeast Portland. Most of the
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federal money was transferred to build a successful fifteen-mile light rail line from
downtown to the eastern suburb of Gresham.4 At the start of the 1990s, Tri-Met's radial bus
and rail system carried 43 percent of the workers who commute into downtown Portland
(compared to 20 percent in Phoenix, 17 percent in Salt Lake City, and 11 percent in
Sacramento).
The "Goldschmidt coalition" and a consensual style remain basic facts of Portland
municipal politics after twenty-five years. Both its formation and its persistence have been
assisted by Portland's social homogeneity. Portland is a middle class city of small business
proprietors, skilled union members, managers, and professionals. Unlike neighboring Seattle,
its history is not one of labor-management conflict or ethnic polarization. At the
neighborhood and census tract level, Portland's social classes intermix at a relatively fine
grain, with stable pockets of high income housing adjacent to a variety of middle and
working class districts. Recent comparative data on the segregation of the poor identify
Portland as one of the most class-integrated metropolitan areas in the country (Abramson,
Tobin and VanderGort 1995).5
The economic strength of the central city and the slow development of suburbs also
dampened the class dimension of city-county politics. The income gap between the central
city and suburbs is relatively small. Median family and household income patterns in the
Portland PMSA can be compared with those in twenty-four other MSAs or PMSAs with
1990 populations between 1 million and 2.5 million. Portland's ratio of metrowide family
income to central city family income was 1.14, below the middle value for the whole set of
metropolitan areas (1.20). Using households rather than families, the Portland metro:city
ratio of 1.21 falls below the midpoint for the set (1.28).
Within this homogeneous social landscape, even the highly volatile issue of lowincome housing has been handled through consensus policies. Advocates for homeless
persons and lower income households have certainly had to battle for attention in City Hall
and downtown board rooms. However, the Portland style is then to bring "well-behaved"
advocacy groups into the conversation. Once on the team, such groups can trade
acquiescence with long-term land redevelopment goals for substantial public commitments to
low-income housing. In the 1980s, for example, agencies serving the homeless population of
4

Again, the Mount Hood Freeway was stopped by a downtown-neighborhood alliance. The self-interest of
neighborhoods in the path of the freeway was obvious. At the same time, a significant segment of the
downtown business community were convinced that centrally focused public transit improvements would be
more beneficial than a second eastside freeway.
5

Working with census tract data, Abramson, Tobin and VanderGort (1995) calculated a dissimilarity index
and an isolation index for persons below poverty level for each of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in 1990.
In 1970, 1980, and 1990, metropolitan Portland had indices substantially below the mean for all large metro
areas; its dissimilarity index in 1990 was sixth lowest among the 100 metro areas.
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Portland's skid road agreed to a cap on shelter beds in the district in return for a go-slow
approach to redevelopment and an active program for relocating shelters and social services.
In the mid-1990s, the Portland Organizing Project (an Alinsky style political organization
based in east side churches) forced consideration of low-income housing as a component of a
massive redevelopment of underutilized railyards north of downtown. Once the development
leadership recognized the power of this populist appeal, however, they moved rapidly to
enfold low-income housing and its advocates into the "River District" planning process. In
the Portland context, these processes are seen as team-building rather than cooptation.
Central City and Older Suburbs
A logical expansion of the Goldschmidt coalition has been the definition of common
agendas by the City of Portland and key suburban cities. The coalition developed in the
1980s around planning for a four-spoke light rail system. With the exception of weakly
organized suburban manufacturers who prefer cross-suburb road improvements, the Portland
area's civic leadership now considers strong public transit to be one of the axioms of regional
development. The cities of Gresham, Milwaukie, Hillsboro, and Beaverton, along with
Washington and Clackamas counties, all recognize that light rail links to downtown Portland
offer strong development potential for secondary activity centers. In effect, leaders in these
communities have chosen to pursue a role as outlying anchors on a radial transportation lines
rather than as beads on a beltway.
The region's light rail system began with an east side line in 1986. Voters in the
three-county core have since approved spending for west side light rail extension (under
construction) and for a north-south line (planning stages). Despite the argument of The
Oregonian that light rail is essential for "Oregon's environmentally wise anti-sprawl policy"
(Oregonian editors 1996), however, voters statewide rejected a state contribution to the
north-south line. It is unclear whether the vote represents the first fracture in the city-suburb
coalition, fallout from political infighting in Clackamas County, general anti-spending
sentiment, downstate response to environmentally oriented ballot measures that could be read
as anti-rural--or all of the above.6
Again, aspects of metropolitan social geography have facilitated a city-suburb
alliance. Portland's African-American population of only 2000 in 1940 grew to 20,000
during the shipbuilding boom of World War II and inched upward to 38,000 in 1990--8
percent of the central city and only 3 percent of the metropolitan area. Most of these newer
Portlanders replaced European immigrants in working class neighborhoods on the east side
of the Willamette River, where they have been physically isolated from downtown Portland
(Portland Bureau of Planning 1993). Taken together, census-defined minorities constitute
6

Since the project already has substantial tri-county and federal funding, possibilities may remain for a pared
down project. The southern extension is particularly important for the regional coalition because Clackamas County
has been waiting patiently in line behind Multnomah and Washington counties.
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only 12 percent of the metropolitan population, making Portland one of the "whitest"
metropolitan areas in the nation. In part because of the same small numbers, racial groups are
relatively well-integrated on the neighborhood scale. Portland in 1990 had only six census
tracts that were more than 50 percent African-American (Abbott 1991a). The index of
dissimilarity was .63 for black/nonblack, .21 for Asian/nonAsian, and .18 for
Hispanic/nonHispanic.
This racial history and geography has meant that city-suburban politics has not
revolved around race and racial avoidance. Plans for intensified development in suburban
communities do not carry an automatic implication of racial change. White Portlanders have
still chosen suburban housing for a wide variety of reasons, but racial flight has not been
prominent among them.
Farmers, Environmentalists and Metropolites
The context for Portland area planning, including the Urban Growth Boundary, is
Oregon's state system of land use planning. In 1973 the legislature established a mandatory
planning program administered by a Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDC). The legislation, which has survived numerous legal challenges and three statewide
referenda, requires every Oregon city and county to prepare a comprehensive plan that
responds to a set of statewide goals. The plans provide the legal support for zoning and other
specific regulations, and the LCDC can require local governments to revise unsatisfactory
plans. Oregon thus operates with a system of strong local planning carried on within
enforceable state guidelines that express a vision of the public interest.
In both its origins and its continued political strength, the Oregon planning system
represents another persistent coalition that spans the Willamette Valley (Knaap 1994; Abbott
and Howe 1993; Walth 1994). The original goal of Oregon Trail emigrants, the valley
contains the state's richest farmland and its three largest cities (Portland, Salem, Eugene).
The movement for state-mandated planning originated in efforts by Willamette Valley
farmers to protect their livelihoods and communities from urban engulfment and scattershot
subdivisions, with their disruptive effects on agricultural practices. As the effort moved
through several legislative versions between 1970 and 1973, fear of California-style sprawl
and the possibility of a mini-megalopolis in Eugene-Seattle corridor attracted Willamette
Valley urbanites to the legislative coalition. The final measure drew overwhelming support
from all parts of the Valley.7

7

Willingness to consider European-style constraints on metropolitan expansion has stemmed in part from a
sense of physical limits unusual in the expansive West. The agricultural zone of the Willamette Valley extends
roughly 100 miles north-south and 40 miles east-west. Valuable Willamette Valley farmland is thus an
obviously finite resource, whose limits are brought home visually by the towering wall of the Cascade
mountains to the east and the dark green slopes of the Coast Range to the west.

14
From the start, the statewide goals linked older urban planning concerns to a newer
environmentalism. The LCDC program rapidly evolved from a purely reactive effort to fend
off erosion of the state's farm economy to a positive attempt to shape a particular urban form.
Several goals have been of special importance for directing metropolitan growth--Goal 3 on
the preservation of farmland, Goal 5 on the preservation of open space, Goal 10 on access to
affordable housing, Goal 11 on the orderly development of public facilities and services,
Goal 13 on energy-efficient land use, and Goal 14 on the definition of Urban Growth
Boundaries (UGBs) to separate urbanizable from rural lands. Although very different in
origins from Portland's city planning initiatives, the state program thus ended up blending the
interests and combining the votes of urbanists, agriculturalists, and environmental advocates
in a way that has mirrored and supported the similar alliance at the metropolitan scale. The
Oregon Farm Bureau, environmental activists, and Portland politicians have all been equally
strong supporters.
Metro adopted the Urban Growth Boundary for the Portland area in 1979.
Supposedly embracing a twenty-year supply of developable land, the UGB is intended to
prevent sprawl by providing for "an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use."
Within the UGB, the burden of proof rests on opponents of land development. Outside the
boundary, the burden rests on developers to show that their land is easily supplied with
necessary services and not worth retention as open space or farmland. Studies indicate that
UGBs around Portland and the other Willamette Valley cities have created a dual land
market that assigns different values to acreage inside and outside the boundary (Nelson
1986).
The UGB is coupled with Goal 10, which essentially mandates a "fair share" housing
policy by requiring that every jurisdiction within the UGB provide "appropriate types and
amounts of land . . . necessary and suitable for housing that meets the housing needs of
households of all income levels." In other words, suburbs are not allowed to use the
techniques of exclusionary zoning to block apartment construction or to isolate themselves as
islands of large-lot zoning. By limiting the speculative development of large, distant
residential tracts, the LCDC system has tended to level the playing field for suburban
development and discourage the emergence of suburban "super developers" with
overwhelming political clout (Toulan 1994). In the Portland region, a Housing Rule adopted
by LCDC now requires that every jurisdiction zone at least half of its vacant residential land
for attached single-family housing or apartments. In effect, the rule enacts a version of a fair
share program that hopes to reduce socioeconomic disparities between city and suburbs by
manipulating density and urban form.
LCDC has also adopted a Transportation Rule that requires local jurisdictions to plan
land uses and facilities to achieve a 20 percent reduction in vehicle miles traveled per capita
over the next twenty years (Adler 1994). The rule flies in the face of the explosive
nationwide growth of automobile mileage. It requires a drastic rethinking of land use patterns
and transportation investment to encourage mixed uses, higher densities, public transit, and
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pedestrians, thus reinforced the light rail strategy. It makes local land use planners and the
Oregon Department of Transportation into allies at the same time that the federal Intermodal
Surface Transportation Enhancement Act is forcing highway builders to rethink their jobs.
With the LCDC system as a framework, Portlanders through the 1990s have engaged
in an prolonged and intelligent debate about metropolitan growth and form. Metro, the
regional government with responsibility for regional planning and selected services, has been
the lead agency for responding to expected population growth. Staff in 1988 realized that
there was no established process for amending the Portland area UGB, even though the state
requires periodic review and anticipates incremental UGB expansion. The agency therefore
designed a classic planning process to develop a "Region 2040" plan for up to a million more
residents in the four core counties. The process was remarkable for the breadth of
participation, including homebuilders and commercial real estate interest as well as growth
management advocates. It was also remarkable for actually changing ideas, starting as an
effort to figure out how much to expand the UGB and ending with a debate over how best to
freeze or limit it.
The Metro Council adopted the "Region 2040 Growth Concept" in December 1994,
outlining broad spatially defined goals for accommodating anticipated growth over the next
half century. The document matches the national professional belief in compact cities by
proposing to focus new jobs and housing on downtown Portland, urban and suburban centers,
and transportation corridors; by identifying rural reserves to remain permanently outside the
UGB (including farm and forest land and prominent natural features); and by adapting
transportation improvements to the land use goals. As table 2 indicates, the Regional 2040
Growth Concept" anticipates sharply increased population density in central Portland, in six
regional growth centers, and along transit corridors. Residential neighborhoods can expect
only mild increases.
Metro followed in October 1996 by adopting an Urban Growth Management
Functional Plan to allocate nearly half a million new residents and jobs anticipated by 2017
within the Urban Growth Boundary.8 Under Metro's 1992 charter, local jurisdictions must
modify their own zoning and land use regulations to implement "functional plans." In fact, a
Metro Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) of elected officials representing city, suburbs,
and counties took the lead in sharing out the expected development. Created in the 1992
charter as a possible check on the Metro Council, MPAC instead became a forum in which
political leaders agreed to match each other's efforts to absorb growth. The result was an
agreement on the number of new housing units and new jobs that each jurisdiction will try to
accommodate. Between them, Gresham, Milwaukie, Hillsboro and Beaverton anticipate
50,000 new housing units and Portland anticipates 70,000. Indeed, several mayors and
8

The Urban Growth Management Functional Plan is itself a component of a comprehensive Regional
Framework Plan, which Metro is required by its charter to adopt by the end of 1997.
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county commissioners on MPAC publicly urged the Metro Council to hang tough on growth
management--a vivid demonstration of the strength of the city-suburb coalition around
compact growth (Nokes 1996b).9
A compact urban form benefits the undeveloped landscape and natural systems as
well as farms. The interest of environmental advocates in Portland growth management also
links closely to the same sense of physical limits that influenced the origins of LCDC, for
relatively little urbanizable land remains between the suburban frontier and edges of the
Northwest forest. Environmental groups have therefore been strong supporters of a compact
metropolis with its bias toward urban social and cultural values.
A representative issue was the West Side Bypass, a one-sixth circumferential
highway proposed to meet lateral transportation needs in fast-growing Washington County.
The county's electronics industry strongly favored the bypass, as did state transportation
officials. Expected opposition came from environmentalists unhappy with any highway
system expansion as promoting wasteful auto-centered living. Other opponents worried
specifically that the proposed route, which looped through rural land outside the UGB, would
inevitably encourage sprawl.
1000 Friends of Oregon, a well-established advocate for strong land use planning,
took the lead in blending the environmental and planning critiques. It used the bypass as the
case study for the nationally funded LUTRAQ study (Making the Land Use, Transportation,
Air Quality Connection). LUTRAQ (1996) extended costs-of-sprawl analysis of alternative
urban form to impacts on air quality and automobile use--with results favoring compact
transit-oriented development. Over a period of several years, the combination of grassroots
and expert opposition shifted the terms of the transportation planning debate and raised the
political costs of the bypass to make it unpalatable to both county and state elected officials.
An ideological consensus about regional growth policy has therefore developed in
parallel with the regional political coalition. The majority of involved citizens in both
Portland and suburbs share a basic vision of a metropolis that above all else is "Not-Los
Angeles" and "Not-Seattle." They agree that the best way to avoid the gridlock and endless
subdivisions that presumably characterize their West Coast neighbors is to support relatively

9

The provisions of the plan include: (1) housing and job targets for each of the area's twenty-four cities and
incorporated portions of three counties that will require higher overall densities; (2) requirements for minimum
development densities for new housing averaging 80 percent of the zoned maximum; (3) exclusion of big box
retailing from industrial zones; (4) minimum and maximum parking ratios for new development; (5) a
requirement that Metro develop specific affordable housing goals; (6) a provision for UGB expansion if enough
communities demonstrate that the targets won't work (Nokes 1996c). Critics argue that the plan actually
involves substantial and unworkable increases from the density increases approved in the 2040 Growth
Concept.
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compact land development within the constraints of the Urban Growth Boundary.10 The
agreement has been broad enough to attract the support of state level politicians. In 1994,
Governor Barbara Roberts issued an executive order giving priority to established
downtowns and transit-accessible sites for new state offices. In 1996, Governor John
Kitzhaber publicly supported efforts to promote "compact, mixed-use development that
provides transportation choices as a way to ensure our communities retain their livability"
(Kitzhaber 1996).
In effect, the recent neotraditional vision of compact development has been layered
on an environmental regionalism of the sort historically associated with Lewis Mumford
(1939). The former draws from the planning and design communities who are the strongest
advocates of "new urbanism." The latter draws on scientific environmentalism with its
concern for sustainable natural systems. The result is a potent alliance between boulevardiers
and environmentalists, friends of city life and friends of trees.

The Costs of Compactness
The compact city is not a perfect city. Portland in the 1990s has surfaced several
issues and problems that need to be explicitly addressed. As with most challenging public
issues, these problems blend arguments over empirical data with conflicts over social and
cultural values.
Loss of Open Space
The mid-1990s have brought a rising awareness within the city of Portland that
increased density will consume local open spaces and vacant lands. With thousands of new
housing units inside the city limits, many residents fear that there will be no breathing space,
no rest for the eye. In specific instances, this fear pits the grassroots organizing goal of
neighborhood stability against the metropolitan environmental agenda of limiting sprawl.
In fact, the Portland region is making choices about its types and locations of open
space. Certainly the Urban Growth Management Functional Plan implies infill of vacant lots
and empty parcels, some of them derelict industrial or residential sites in inner
neighborhoods. Many of these informal additions to neighborhood open space will vanish.
However, the Portland area has numerous large parks and extensive stream corridors close to
its center (the problem of urban coyotes and suburban cougars that use these spaces became a
public concern in mid-1996). In addition, voters in 1995 gave Metro a $136 million bond
issue to acquire potential park lands on both sides of the UGB. In broadest terms, the
10

In 1994, Metro received 17,000 responses to a mail-in questionnaire about regional planning issues.
Half the responses included additional write-in comments. The feedback strongly favored higher densities,
smaller lots, and transit-oriented development.
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compact city model trades off neighborhood open space for quicker access to rural lands
outside the metropolitan area.
The buried issue is not so much the amount of open space as its accessibility by
socioeconomic class. As their property taxes pay off Metro's bonds, Portlanders will be
buying suburban parks and preserves. As they cope with infill housing, they will be
protecting farms and forested hillsides fifteen miles away. Such spaces are great for hikers,
mountain bikers, and weekend excursions. They are less useful for inner neighborhood kids
and summer youth programs.
Housing Affordability
Portland in the mid-1990s has a serious shortage of housing affordable by new
households and working class families. In the aggregate, housing prices rose rapidly in the
1970s, dropped during Oregon's prolonged recession in the early and middle 1980s,
recovered in the late 1980s, and escalated rapidly in the 1990s. In constant dollars, the
median sale price of a single family house in the Portland area increased by 50 percent from
1988 to 1995, finally passing the previous high of 1979 (Joint Center for Housing Studies
1996). The median price is still below that in most other west coast metropolitan areas, but
price increases have been especially troublesome because per capita income has been
stagnant (Ahluwalia 1995; Nokes 1996a).
A tight housing market has also led to explosive price increases in previously
undervalued neighborhoods. In the early 1990s, middle class neighborhoods on the less
fashionable east side of Portland closed much of the price gap with west side neighborhoods.
By the mid-1990s, families and speculators were hunting for rapidly disappearing bargains
in neglected working class and racially mixed areas. Commented one retired grocery
checker from northeast Portland, "That's the talk of the town, people coming over and buying
up these houses. You look at all the people. They're not black. I thought you people were
too scared to come over in this neighborhood" (Mayer 1996; Lane 1995).
Advocates of growth management and proponents of untrammeled markets can agree
on many facts but not the cause. The Metropolitan Home Builders Association and market
advocates argue that a tight Urban Growth Boundary artificially constricts land supply and
drives up the price of undeveloped land, with serious consequences for home prices
(Mildner, Dueker, and Rufolo 1996). Growth managers, and Metro in specific, think that the
essential problem is one of booming demand as Portland enjoys flush times and what may be
a one-time influx of capital from a wave of California in-migrants in the early 1990s. They
cite Urban Land Institute data that lot price increases in metropolitan Portland for 1990-95
were in line with increases in numerous comparable cities from Albuquerque to Indianapolis
to Charlotte. Believers in a compact Portland also argue that expansion of the UGB would
be a temporary fix at best, with most land freed by such an expansion being used for large lot
developments. Indeed, they argue that a compact city promotes affordability by reducing
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infrastructure costs and by encouraging small lot development, infill, and accessory units
(Burton 1996; see also Downs 1992).
Behind the competing assumptions are alternative visions of the good city.
Remembering that households rent or buy a neighborhood as well as a dwelling unit with
each housing choice, UGB advocates can argue that compactness increases the value of the
housing-neighborhood package by promoting more "real neighborhoods" along the neotraditional model. Those who argue for expansion might counter that a tight UGB reduces
the value of the same package by making it more difficult to opt for Green Acres.
There is also little doubt that maintaining a tight growth boundary tends to interrupt
the classic trickle-down approach to affordable housing. Traditionally we have assumed that
upper income families in search of newer and bigger houses will walk away from perfectly
good neighborhoods and hand them down the economic ladder. This process has made some
affordable housing available, but it has also tended to devalue working class neighborhoods
except when aggregate demand is very high. Indeed, the trickle-down model has seriously
undercut homeownership as a capital accumulation strategy for the working class (Edel,
Sclar and Luria 1984). With a tight UGB, the Portland area will be less likely to hand down
cheap housing for new households, but also less likely to undermine the investments of many
working class and middle class families.
"Thank God for Clark County"
Does Portland do it with sleight of hand? In recent years, the fastest growing
segment of the metropolitan area has been Clark County, Washington. Untrammeled by
Oregon's strict land use system, Clark County has been a safety valve that offers an easy
location for residents and builders who like the low-density suburban model.
However, Clark County development patterns will be increasingly constrained by
Washington's Growth Management Act (Gale 1992). Passed in 1990 and amended in 1991,
the Act is mandatory for the state's large and fast-growing counties, including Clark. As in
the Oregon system, the county is required to prepare a plan that responds to statewide goals,
including creation of an urban growth boundary, although the state has limited power to alter
the content of local plans.
As the Washington state system is fully implemented in the late 1990s, the effects are
unpredictable. Substantial political conflicts over development and infrastructure within
Clark County divide the older city of Vancouver, rapidly suburbanizing areas, and rural
districts. Regulations that favor compact development patterns have the possibility of
diverting growth pressure to Oregon and complicating the careful tradeoffs of 2040.
Unheeded Voices
Consensual politics leave little room for principled dissent, for they assume basic
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agreement on community goals. With all its virtues, the Portland style tends to muffle
radically dissenting voices who are unwilling to work on the "team." Although advocates of
the Portland consensus would disagree, it is possible that a pattern of cooptation stifles a
serious hearing for good ideas by whittling away at genuine alternatives under they fit the
mold.
One example is Portland's tradition of middle class populism. Since the late
nineteenth century, an economy of skilled workers and small businesses has nourished
dissenting political tradition that distrusts professional expertise and corporate leadership
(Johnston 1993). Nearly every mayoral and city council election shows a divide between the
outer east side neighborhoods and the central and close-in neighborhoods most benefitted by
the Goldschmidt package. In socioeconomic terms, the divide pits anti-tax populists against
quality-of-life liberals. However, the city's system of at-large elections combines with its
dominant good government ideology to keep such dissent in the minority; in the 1990s it has
popped up instead in statewide anti-tax movements.
At the metropolitan scale, the Portland system has little room for new suburban
economic interests. In typical postwar metropolis, new suburban industries have been able to
dominate suburban governments in the same way that downtown growth coalitions
dominated central city administrations and politics. One result has been metropolitan
fragmentation, but another has been an opportunity for new voices and forces to enter the
political arena. In a sense, loosely knit metropolitan areas have contributed to political
pluralism, perhaps functioning as political safety valves.
In Portland, a physically compact and institutionally integrated metropolis has left
little elbow room for new interests. As described, older suburbs are partners in the compact
city growth alliance. The most important new economic interest to emerge in the last two
decades has been the substantial electronics industry in Washington County. However, the
industry has been particularly frustrated by its inability to promote lateral highways to help
get suburban workers to their jobs (see the Westside Bypass story) or to secure local and
state funding for a major engineering school in the western suburbs.11
Unheeded interests are the seeds for new political revolutions. If the Portland
consensus erodes and collapses, the probable cause will be challenges from "outsider" groups
that see no benefits from public investments and take no pleasure in higher density. The
most likely counter-coalition would combine anti-tax populists with local activists mobilized
to defend moderate income neighborhoods against higher densities and social changes
(O'Toole 1996). Such a counter-coalition would raise the banner of status quo against the
11

Washington County contains the small, private Oregon Graduate Institute with programs in the sciences
and engineering. The large undergraduate engineering program of Portland State
University operates in downtown Portland. Oregon State University's graduate engineering programs are 80
miles south of the electronics heartland.
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changes in the urban fabric (and associated costs) required by the vision of a compact city.12

Lessons from Portland
The preceding discussion has repeatedly singled out civic consensus and political
will as the forces that have pulled policy fragments into a coherent and effective strategy for
Portland metropolitan development. It is clear that most American cities have access to the
technical and policy tools they need in order to maintain centered metropolitan areas. The
achievement of compact and efficient urban form is a solvable issue of the sort that James Q.
Wilson wrote about twenty-five years ago:
These problems . . . fiscal imbalance, traffic congestion, air pollution, the movement of jobs
away from minority groups . . . are susceptible to rather precise formulation and
study; alternative ways of coping with them can be conceived and evaluated with a
certain rigor; the obstacles to remedial action are primarily political (and to a certain
degree economic) . . . what is most important, something can be done (Wilson, 1970,
p. 398).
With Wilson's challenge in mind, what advice might other cities draw from Portland's
admittedly peculiar history of municipal and regional policy making. Are there useful
lessons for Louisville's civic leaders, pointers for Pittsburgh politicians?
In looking for generalizable lessons in Portland's history of planning and policy
making, it is useful to bear in mind that Portland in the aggregate is not an unusual
metropolitan area. Comparison of basic demographic and economic indicators for Portland
and the seven other large metropolitan areas in the northwestern quadrant of the United
States (table 3) show Portland in the middle of the pack. It is sixth in total population,
seventh in minority population, sixth in home ownership percentage, sixth in per capita
income, and second in percentage of workers in finance, insurance, and real estate.
Variability of Housing Tastes
Economic models of housing and land markets tend to project past consumer
preferences into future. We know from other consumption arenas, however, that tastes and
behaviors change--that millions of Americans can decide to grind out their cigarettes, or that
four-cylinder Hondas can push Roadmasters and Rocket-88s out of American driveways.
12

An alternative counter-coalition between eastside anti-tax populists and westside high tech entrepreneurs
is less likely to be lasting. The two groups in the mid-19960s could agree on opposition to light rail expansion,
but their reasons were different. Anti-taxers don't want to spend the money. The electronics lobby would
prefer to spend it on something different.
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Portland in the 1990s shows that tastes for housing are similarly flexible and that
suburban large-lot housing fails to satisfy a large segment of the market. Old neighborhoods
with tightly packed houses become hot spots. New row houses, small lot subdivisions, and
upscale downtown condominiums jump off the market. A series of demonstration projects
and market subdivisions in 1995 and 1996 have successfully offered a variety of
configurations of individually-owned small-lot housing. One example is a suburban
development of freestanding houses on 2500 square foot lots that have sold out before
completion. Another is a demonstration project on a vacant half-block in a middle income
Portland neighborhood. Its eighteen row house, courtyard, and duplex units with average
floor area of 1200 square feet sold within months.
Anecdotal evidence from other cities also shows the breadth of the housing market.
Many households still prefer freestanding houses on relatively large lots. However, the range
of preferences for alternative styles and configurations is more varied than appraisers and
bankers are willing to allow, especially as the structure of households becomes more varied.
Urban Growth Boundaries as Planning Tools
Urban Growth Boundaries in various forms have become popular solutions to
metropolitan planning problems, frequently proposed in tandem with the principles of neotraditional design and the New Urbanism. UGBs or their equivalents are found in several
state planning systems, such as those in Washington and New Jersey, and have been adopted
or advocated in cities as diverse as Boulder, Colorado and San Jose, California. In fastgrowing metropolitan areas, they can prevent explosive deconcentration of urban activities.
In stagnant regions, they can maintain the market focus on areas that are already urbanized
and perhaps slow class segregation.
The Portland experience offers several additional suggestions about the use of UGBs.
First is the reminder that growth boundaries are long term commitments, not quick panaceas.
They work best when they are part of a planning implementation package that includes
public transit investment, infill development, and affordable housing strategies. Like all
planning tools, UGBs also need to be flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances.
In Portland in the mid-1990s, the UGB has become a symbol as well as a tool. Many
residents now regard it as a metaphor for the region's ability to control its own future in the
face of national and global market forces. If the idea of a "frozen" UGB becomes a politically
untouchable absolute, however, the region will lose flexibility and may invite future
problems of congestion or housing affordability.
The Value of Incrementalism
Portland has built its particular urban form and its supportive institutions of planning
and growth management through a series of small decisions. The decisions and institutionbuilding that have shaped the Portland of 1996 had their beginnings in the late 1960s.
During these three decades, residents of the Portland area have moved one step at a time.
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They have addressed problems in sequence rather than trying for comprehensive one-time
solution to a complex set of concerns. They have also built public institutions incrementally.
An example is the evolution of Metro from the Columbia Region Association of
Governments (CRAG) in 1966, addition of a Metropolitan Service District (MSD) in 1970,
modification of CRAG in 1974, merger of CRAG and MSD into Metro in 1978, and the
further expansion of Metro's authority and independence in 1992.
Other cities might also think about the value of incremental approaches to growth
management. It is common wisdom among housing advocates and community organizers
that it is vital to start with small but winnable issues to build community confidence and
political momentum before tackling the hard problems. The Portland experience suggests
that an analogous approach may be relevant for citywide and regional planning and growth
management.
A Habit of Planning
Incremental policy-making has allowed Portlanders to develop a habit of planning.
Portland's civic community is comfortable and familiar with planning processes, issues, and
terminologies. Issues of planning are part of the civic discourse and a staple of local news
reporting to an extent unusual in other cities. As DLCD staffer Mitch Rohse puts it, "the
ethos or culture of land-use planning has absolutely permeated the population" (Hylton 1995;
also see Abbott 1994b).
Metropolitan areas frequently take a single well-publicized swing at defining a
regional agenda. Examples in recent years have been the Civic Index Project of the National
Civic League and newspaper-sponsored reports on metropolitan issues by Neal Peirce. The
Portland experience suggests the importance of following such highly visible activities with
continued discussion through ongoing newspaper coverage and through conferences,
meetings, and specialized publications sponsored by locally based institutions. These
institutions might be urban universities, government agencies, or nonprofit advocacy
organizations (such as 1000 Friends of Oregon or the Regional Planning Association of New
York).
This conclusion draws support from the experiences of other cities where repeated
discussion and promotion of a set of policy alternatives and the underlying public values has
shifted the center of political discourse over time. An example is the gradual acceptance of
neighborhood based growth management in San Francisco after 1975 (DeLeon 1991;
McGovern 1993). The appropriate forums and sponsors and the most pressing issues will
vary from one metropolitan area to the next, but the principle of gradual and persistent
education is constant.
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Institutionalizing Good Ideas
The impacts of civic discussion and education can be reinforced by the creation of
institutional or organizational homes for good planning ideas, making the procedures of
planning and growth management into everyday routines. In 1973, for example, the Oregon
legislature followed the Progressive era tactic of depoliticizing governmental decisions in the
interest of "good government" when it placed the state planning system under an independent
commission. The Portland area offers other examples of the bureaucratization of "good
planning," including the regular participation of neighborhood associations in Portland
planning decisions (Adler and Blake 1990), the application of design review to downtown
development (Abbott 1991b), and the depoliticizing of metropolitan transportation decisions
(Edner and Adler 1991).
In the Portland area, planning bureaucracies have brought strong community
movements into regular relationships with other interests. They have helped to channel high
levels of public concern into accepted procedures designed to implement a community
consensus. At best, such procedures equalize access to public decision-making and tend to
reduce the privileges of wealth. In their turn, the presence of strong municipal and regional
institutions for planning and policy formulation facilitate the "good government" habit
(Lewis 1996).
Coalition Building
The central point of the preceding analysis is the importance of building stable
political coalitions for moving a metropolitan regional agenda. Portlanders share a political
culture that considers policy alliances and team building as the normal way of doing public
business. Nurtured in nonpartisan political institutions for local government, the Portland
style prefers protracted discussion and negotiation to ideological battles and electoral
confrontation. At its worst, coalition politics ignores and isolates pockets of dissent in favor
of a soft middle ground. At its best, it involves a search for a common public good that
transcends the summation of individual and group interests.
As described for metropolitan Portland, city-level coalitions nest within regional
coalitions. An important result of Portland's city-level planning initiatives, for example, has
been an ability to avoid viewing downtown and neighborhoods as rivals in a zero-sum game.
Urban politics nationwide has frequently pitted advocates of neighborhood needs against
proponents of downtown development, with both sides fighting for the attention and
resources of city hall. Examples of this polarization can be drawn from every part of the
country--from Chicago (Suttles 1990) to San Antonio (Abbott 1987), Seattle (Bello 1993),
and Los Angeles (Davis 1992). Since the 1960s, in contrast, Portlanders have recognized that
the "Goldschmidt strategy" makes every district within five miles of the central business
district into a winner. The city-suburban coalition has a similar basis--a belief that there is
enough growth for both city and suburbs to negotiate equitable cuts and to make such
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potentially explosive issues as fair share housing politically palatable.
Portland's bias toward centrist coalitions can be framed in the perspectives of urban
political theory. In Paul Peterson's terminology (Peterson 1981) neighborhood and
downtown interests unite around a carefully balanced developmental agenda rather than
fighting over redistribution of resources. In the terms of John Logan and Harvey Molotch
(1987), downtown and neighborhood interests come together as parts of a mild-mannered
growth machine. The same analyses apply as well to the city-suburban growth management
coalition.
It is unlikely that the basis for coalition building will be the same in other
metropolitan areas where different issues may be foremost in the public mind. Another
commonly suggested catalyst for assembling a metropolitan coalition, for example, is
equitable sharing of city and suburban tax resources (as in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region).
In a different community it might be the creation of political bridges across racial divides.
Whatever the issue, the need for long-term commitments to a broad public interest argues
very strongly for networks of community support that outlast the short term election cycle.
Self-conscious coalitions built on shared visions of a community future potentially have the
necessary staying power.

Conclusion
An appropriate headline to capture the Portland experience would be "City and
Suburbs Talk to Each Other . . . And Sometimes Agree!" The growth management process
in Portland in the late 1990s reflects a political culture that values coalition building over
electoral confrontation and balances the brokering of economic and political interests with a
serious regard for rational argument. Portland's ethos also assumes that it is possible to find
common goals and goods (if not necessarily a unitary public interest). Comments Mayor
Gussie McRobert of Gresham (the second largest city in the Portland area), "in Oregon we
have a tradition of being able to set aside our individual interest for the broader good of the
community" (Hylton 1995, 117). A few years earlier, a prominent economic and civic leader
challenged an audience of citizens to hold fast to a "moral obligation to the idea of Oregon"
(Abbott 1994a).
The organization and character of the public realm is thus the key variable that makes
Portland different. Its experience suggests that the specifics of policy and planning decisions
need to be embedded in a "thick" environment of discourse and debate and to be thought
through as civic choices by citizens and officials. In concert with recent ideas about social
and civic capital (Putnam 1993), these discussions should engage multiple groups and utilize
multiple forums--the formal citizen participation process for public agencies, neighborhood
associations, civic organizations, and a wide range of issue-advocacy groups.

26
Portland's "lesson" is less about growth management than about democracy. Its
planning debates are about specific goals, but an underlying function has been to build a
sense of community and to provide opportunities for exploring common interests. Other
metropolitan areas might emulate what's best about Portland by engaging in rich and
vigorous democratic discussion about their most salient issues--about ethnicity and equity, or
economic transition, or fair sharing of public resources.
These suggestions resemble the theoretical work of Jurgen Habermas (1984) and his
adaptation to planning by John Forester (1989) and Judith Innes (Innes 1995, 1996).
Habermas's theory of communicative rationality places reiterative discussion at the center of
civic life. Experts learn from citizens and citizens from experts in a continual refining of
ideas; the public realm takes on a life and value of its own. The achievement of consensus
becomes a valuable and positive product in itself, not a compromise among conflicting
interests but an understanding of common needs and goals. In this light, the Portland
experience is ultimately an argument for the value of talk and the power of democracy.
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Table 1. Portland Metropolitan Population since 1950

City of Portland

1950

Metropolitan Area

374,000

705,000

1960

373,000

822,000

1970

382,000

1,007,000

1980

365,000

1,245,000

1990

437,000

1,478,000

1995

498,000

2,024,000

Metropolitan area: four counties 1950-1980; five county Consolidated Metropolitan
Statistical Area in 1990; eight county Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area in 1995.
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Table 2. Proposed Population Densities: 2040 Growth Concept
Area Type
(people/acre)
Downtown
Portland
Regional
Centers

1990 Density 2040 Density New Households

150

250

5 percent

22 percent

24

60

3 percent

9 percent

Town Centers 23
Transit
Corridors

New Employment

45

18

3 percent

24

Main Streets 36

39

33 percent
2 percent

7 percent

19 percent
3 percent

Inner
Neighborhoods

11

15

21 percent

8 percent

Outer
Neighborhoods

10

13

17 percent

7 percent

6 percent

25 percent

Industrial and
Commercial
Areas
...

...

Regional centers include large suburban downtowns and areas around superregional malls; town centers
include smaller suburban downtowns; transit corridors include light rail routes and major arterial
highways; main streets include older streetcar era shopping streets and secondary automobile strips.
Source: City Club 1996.
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Table 3. Portland and Comparable Cities: Social and Economic Indicators
Denver Kansas Minneapolis Omaha
City
St. Paul
Population
(1000s)
Percent
Black

1,848 1566

4.8%

2464

618

12.6% 2.5%

8.0%

Percent
Hispanic

10.9% 2.6%

Percent
housing
owneroccupied

62.9% 66.8% 67.3%

65.1%

Personal
income
per capita,
1988

$18,247

$19,371

FIRE as
percent
total
employment

7.3%

7.6%

1.1%

$17,076

2.3%

6.9%

Metropolitan area definitions and data for 1990, except as noted.
Denver-Boulder CMSA (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area)
Kansas City MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area)
Minneapolis-St. Paul MSA
Omaha MSA
Portland-Vancouver CMSA
Sacramento MSA
Salt Lake City MSA
Seattle-Tacoma CMSA
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census 1992

$15,873

9.0%

30

Portland

Sacramento
City

1478

1481

1072

2559

2.6%

6.2%

0.8%

4.4%

2.3%

11.8%

63.1%

61.5%

Salt Lake

5.3%

69.9%

Seattle

2.3%

63.8%

$16,446

$17,050

$13,090

$18,539

8.0%
(PMSA)

6.5%

5.7%

6.7%
(PMSA)
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